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TIME’S UP: A CALL TO ERADICATE
NCAA MONOPSONY THROUGH
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Ashley Jo Zaccagnini*
Few traditions are as near and dear to the hearts of Americans as college athletics. The
institution holds a special place in society because it reflects the ultimate convergence of
those values that uniquely define the United States: loyalty, competitiveness, and pride.
However, the notion of basic fairness seems to have been excluded along the way, as the
commercialization of college athletics gave way to total dominance over the industry by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA promulgates sports rules
and organizes collegiate-level championships, but its most influential role involves promoting
“amateurism,” or the notion that student-athletes are not entitled to compensation because
college athletics should be about the love of the game, not monetization. While amateurism
may be touted as an honorable principle aimed at preserving the character of college athletics
and its differences from professional sports, the principle is more difficult to justify at a time
when the NCAA earns $1.1 billion per year in revenue, none of which is shared among
student-athletes who work full-time and typically live below the poverty line.
Last year, state legislators paused to consider whether any justification exists for
continuing to adhere to the NCAA’s archaic system of denying compensation to studentathletes in light of the fact that “amateurism” holds no significance in a legal sense. Given
the lack of any such justification, the California legislature became the first to explicitly
defy the NCAA in passing the Fair Pay to Play Act in September of 2019. Since then, a
number of states have followed suit by drafting nearly identical laws that would likewise
have the effect of permitting student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their name,
image, and likeness (NIL). Unsurprisingly, NCAA leadership vehemently condemned the
movement at first, threatening to strip member institutions affected by the new legislation
from the organization altogether. The NCAA has since reneged on its hostile position,
making a public commitment to reform its policies so as to authorize paid endorsement
opportunities for student-athletes on some level. However, the organization will undoubtedly
attempt to minimize the impact of the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny whether through
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.A., Political Science, Southern
Methodist University, 2018. Ashley Jo would like to thank her friends and family, especially Kim and
Alicia, for their constant support.
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litigation or by crafting new restrictive policies ultimately aimed at nullifying the effects of
new laws. Admittedly, the state-by-state approach to adopting a new stance on athlete
compensation comes with a number of practical challenges, thereby providing fertile ground
for the NCAA to launch powerful objections.
This Comment aims to present a workable solution in the form of a comprehensive
federal law, which would secure the rights of student-athletes to earn compensation for use
of their NILs before the NCAA is given the opportunity to preempt the significance of that
right. While several congressmen have drafted federal laws related to the topic of NIL rights
in this context, this Comment identifies particular issues that have been overlooked at the
state level thus far, recommending specific provisions that would not only embrace studentathletes’ rights in principle as a matter of basic fairness, but make those rights a practicable
and economically feasible reality.
I.
II.
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IV.

V.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For nearly a century, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has
monopolized the college-sports industry and persistently invoked the principle of
“amateurism” as a justification for denying the right of college athletes to benefit
financially from use of their name, image, and likeness (NIL).1 Student-athletes
have attempted to assert their right to compensation through litigation, primarily
attacking the NCAA on both antitrust and labor and employment grounds.2
While courts have traditionally deferred to amateurism as necessary to preserve
the popularity of college athletics and the value of higher education,3 the Ninth
Circuit’s recent O’Bannon v. NCAA decision called the NCAA’s model into
question, reflecting public sentiment in asserting that no legal basis exists on
which to deny the right of student-athletes to be compensated for use of their
NILs.4 California legislators responded to the landmark decision by passing the
Fair Pay to Play Act in September 2019,5 inspiring at least nine other states to
draft or pass bills similarly aimed at granting student-athletes the ability to benefit
financially from the use of their NILs.6 In response to the Fair Pay to Play Act, the
1. NCAA, 2020-21 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 2.9 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION
I MANUAL].
2. Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
475, 495–97 (2015).
3. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
4. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063–79 (9th Cir. 2015).
5. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019).
6. Charlotte Carroll, Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS
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NCAA threatened to expel California’s colleges and universities from its league,
but tempered that position within a month as the number of state legislatures
signaling agreement with California’s position increased.7 Rather than strip
institutions of NCAA membership, the organization instead promised to consider
adopting new bylaws that would permit athletes to be compensated for
endorsements by January 2021.8
As of April 2021, the NCAA has avoided its commitment to reform by
continuously delaying consideration of new bylaws despite its apparent
willingness to concede.9 Unfortunately for the NCAA, however, the United States
Supreme Court is not waiting around. On March 31, 2021, the Court expressed
collective disdain toward “amateurism” during oral arguments in the case of
NCAA v. Alston.10 Even March Madness could not distract sports commentators
from realizing that with Justices on both ends of the ideological spectrum blasting
criticisms against the NCAA, amateurism’s days are likely numbered.11 Yet, a win
for student-athletes in Alston—which asks whether the NCAA can legally restrict
the payment of modest, education-related sums to players—would not necessarily
make the unqualified right to NIL compensation a reality.12 Rather, as states
continue adopting NIL statutes one-by-one, the NCAA’s defense against
compliance is strengthened based on its practical inability to comply with varying
or even contradictory mandates. This Comment will analyze the numerous angles
from which the NCAA could still prevent the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny
from having any effect, highlighting the practical obstacles states failed to consider
in drafting new laws that could drastically undermine the goal of achieving fair
compensation for student-athletes. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that an
innovative, yet logistically feasible solution in the form of a comprehensive federal
law granting student-athletes the right to earn NIL compensation is necessary.
Part II of this Comment will describe the history of the NCAA and the
organization’s commitment to the principle of amateurism, which underlies the
legal context to be discussed in Part III. Part IV will discuss the movement
supporting expanded student-athlete compensation rights as spurred by
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fair-playimage-likeness-laws [https://perma.cc/PKZ9-T3X5].
7. See Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image, and Likeness Opportunities, NCAA
(Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/boardgovernors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities [https://perma.cc/4U8YR5MM].
8. Id.
9. Student-Athlete Committees Issue Joint Statement on Name, Image, Likeness Legislation Delay,
NCAA
(Jan.
15,
2021
1:36
PM),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/student-athlete-committees-issue-joint-statement-name-image-likeness-legislation-delay
[https://perma.cc/3EUP-EPKS].
10. Ross Dellenger, Supreme Court Rips Into NCAA System, But a Win for Athletes’ Rights is Far
From
Guaranteed,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.si.com/college/2021/03/31/supreme-court-alston-ncaa-athletes-rights
[https://perma.cc/7YMY-JHD3].
11. See id.
12. See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1264 (9th Cir.) (“Contrary to Student-Athletes’
understanding, this analysis reflects the judgment that limits on cash compensation unrelated to
education do not, on this record, constitute anticompetitive conduct and, thus, may not be
enjoined.”), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020).
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California’s passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act, in addition to providing an
overview of similar proposed legislation under consideration in a number of
states. Part V will analyze potential legal challenges compromising the validity of
the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny, questioning whether perpetuating the
notion that student-athletes should be compensated for endorsements is
worthwhile given the practical challenges and potential disadvantages associated
with the policy. Ultimately, this Comment will conclude that (1) continuing the
fight for student-athlete compensation rights is necessary given the advantages to
be gained from such a policy; and (2) codifying that right in the form of a
comprehensive federal law as set forth in Part VI will alleviate the complexities
and practical challenges associated with the state-by-state approach to legislating
college athletes’ NIL rights.
II. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
The NCAA was born out of necessity during President Theodore Roosevelt’s
administration, primarily as a means for encouraging safer practices in men’s
college football.13 In the year 1905 alone, the sport caused eighteen deaths and
hundreds of injuries.14 Consequently, the President facilitated the creation of the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association (renamed the NCAA in 1910), charging its
sixty-two original members with the task of formulating intercollegiate sports
regulations.15 For most of the twentieth century, the NCAA’s role was confined
to rulemaking and tournament scheduling until profitability and heightened
public interest in college sports materialized in accordance with the advent of
television.16 NCAA executives capitalized on the opportunity to increase the
organization’s enforcement power in the 1940s and 1950s by establishing
restrictive policies designed to alleviate exploitative recruitment practices, while at
the same time securing television contracts valued in excess of one million
dollars.17 Since that period, the NCAA’s sophistication, scope, and revenuegenerating capacity have increased even more substantially.18
Today, the NCAA defines itself as “an organization dedicated to providing a
pathway to opportunity for college athletes,” of which more than 1,100 colleges
and universities are members.19 Together with athletics conferences spanning the
country, the NCAA facilitates sports competitions involving 19,500 teams and
nearly half a million students.20 The NCAA conducts ninety national
championships every year, providing college athletes the opportunity to compete
at the highest level in a variety of college sports ranging from men’s football to
13. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 13–14.
17. Id. at 14–15.
18. Id. at 21.
19. NCAA, 2020-21 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE 2 (2020),
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/Student_Resources/CBSA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UP8W-VNES].
20. Id.
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women’s equestrian.21 Member schools are organized into three NCAA divisions,
with Division I schools offering the largest budgets, scholarship opportunities,
and student bodies.22 Division I schools may award athletic scholarships covering
tuition and fees, room and board, plus other school-related expenses.23 However,
fewer than 2% of high school athletes secure an NCAA sports scholarship in any
division each year,24 and those who do are only awarded an average of
$18,000.00.25
A. NCAA REGULATIONS
The NCAA is widely perceived as one of the most important regulatory bodies
in the sports industry, though its requirements for eligibility are often viewed as
burdensome and even controversial due to their restrictiveness.26 The
organization’s current Division I manual alone sets forth 408 pages of bylaws
governing member institutions and their athletes.27 The bylaws are promulgated
at an annual convention by member representatives serving on committees that
propose NCAA policies.28 While member institutions thus decide which policies
are to be adopted and implemented on campuses, NCAA employees ultimately
interpret the organization’s rules.29 The NCAA’s enforcement power also depends
on the work of committees within the organization itself, beginning with
enforcement investigations staff tasked with inspecting potential infractions.30
Depending on the seriousness of a given violation, the enforcement process may
proceed in the form of a negotiated resolution, summary disposition track, or
hearing track, all of which the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions (COI)
oversees.31 The NCAA defines the COI as an “independent administrative body”
consisting of volunteers from member institutions and their employees.32 In
accordance with the bylaws, the COI is empowered to “conduct hearings or
reviews, find facts, conclude violations of NCAA legislation, prescribe appropriate
penalties and monitor institutions on probation to ensure compliance with
penalties.”33
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Mark J. Drozdowski, Should College Athletes Be Paid?, BEST COLLS. (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.bestcolleges.com/blog/should-college-athletes-bepaid/#:~:text=The%20average%20athletic%20scholarship%20is,athletes%20receive%20a%20full
%20scholarship [https://perma.cc/N8HS-5CCC].
26. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 12:3 (2019).
27. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1.
28. Id. art. 5.1.1.1; What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/5UZQ-AQDS].
29. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 5.4.1.2.1; What is the NCAA?, supra note 28.
30. Division I Infractions Process, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/division-iinfractions-process [https://perma.cc/N8VN-W28Y].
31. Id.;
Division
I
Committee
on
Infractions,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/divis
ion-i-committee-infractions
[https://perma.cc/QHD4-4FX3].
32. Division I Committee on Infractions, supra note 31.
33. Id.
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B. THE NCAA’S COMMITMENT TO AMATEURISM
The lengthy and complex nature of the NCAA’s regulatory scheme may be
explained by the organization’s commitment to the principle of amateurism,
which the NCAA cites as essential to maintaining “a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”34 Amateur status
depends on participation being “motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived” from college athletics as an
“avocation,” not an occupation.35 According to the NCAA, amateurism also
encompasses the notion that “student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”36
The NCAA’s concern with preventing the professionalization of college
athletics underlies all of its regulations. For instance, the recruitment process is
heavily regulated, providing for short contact periods and limited opportunities
during which member institutions may communicate with high school athletes,
with different sets of rules applying to face-to-face introductions, telephone calls,
and “official” visitation days.37 Even after a student-athlete officially commits to a
member institution, he or she must provide evidence of amateur status by
obtaining an amateurism certificate prior to obtaining eligibility at a Division I or
II school.38 Further, participation in any of the following activities may
compromise a student-athlete’s amateur status: receiving payment from a sports
team for participation; engaging a professional marketing or sports agent;
accepting prize money; or promoting commercial products or services.39
Moreover, the NCAA imposes strict academic policies, requiring its athletes to be
enrolled in a full schedule of classes at all times during the academic year and to
maintain a minimum grade point average based on the member institution’s
general requirements.40 A violation of any of the aforementioned bylaws relating
to recruitment, amateur status, or academics may result in immediate ineligibility
for the member institution or student-athlete involved.41
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. EARLY LEGAL CHALLENGES TO NCAA REGULATIONS: AMATEURISM
PREVAILS
While amateurism is not a legally binding principle, the NCAA’s commitment
to preserving the amateur status of college sports has allowed it to survive
numerous legal challenges by student-athletes opposing its restrictive policies. For

34. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 1.3.1.
35. Id. art. 2.9.
36. Id.
37. Id. arts. 13.02, 13.1.
38. Amateurism,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism
[https://perma.cc/65QS-KH8M].
39. Id.
40. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, arts. 14.2.1, 14.4.3.3.
41. Id. arts. 3.2.5, 12.11.1.
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instance, in the early 1990s, a running back for the University of Notre Dame
sued the NCAA upon losing his collegiate eligibility by entering the NFL draft,
even though he was not ultimately selected.42 The player invoked § 1 of the
Sherman Act—which “makes it unlawful for anyone to contract, combine in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspire, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states”43—in challenging the NCAA’s “no-draft” rule on the grounds
that the rule had an anticompetitive effect on the sports industry.44 The NCAA
argued the rule was necessary to ensure student-athletes’ profit-making objectives
would not overshadow their educational goals, and that overturning the rule
would “blur the line between college and professional football, and create a
number of potential problems for the effective management of teams engaged in
college football.”45 The court agreed with the NCAA’s rationale, citing the
“significant procompetitive effects” of the amateurism principle.46
Also in 1990, a Vanderbilt University football player lost his suit against the
NCAA in a nearly identical antitrust case challenging the NCAA’s “no-agent”
rule.47 The plaintiff relied on a landmark Supreme Court case from six years prior
in arguing the NCAA’s regulations are commercial in nature and therefore subject
to antitrust scrutiny.48 However, the court turned to a Fifth Circuit case49 to
explain the “clear difference between the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the televising
of college football games and the NCAA’s efforts to maintain a discernable line
between amateurism and professionalism.”50 Essentially, while the court
recognized that the NCAA and its multimillion dollar annual budget were not
totally exempt from antitrust regulation because its television contracts were clearly
commercial in nature, it created a narrow exception for eligibility rules solely
intended to preserve amateurism.51
While the courts in Banks and Gaines gave credence to amateurism where
collegiate football players had engaged in activities unquestionably characteristic
of professional football, the court in Bloom v. NCAA refused to permit a studentathlete to benefit financially from endorsement deals even though they were
unrelated to his NCAA sport altogether.52 In compliance with NCAA
regulations,53 the plaintiff competed as a member of his university football team
while simultaneously pursuing a career in professional skiing.54 Prior to
42. Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 853–54 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
43. Id. at 857–58; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1.
44. Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 855, 860.
45. Id. at 860–61.
46. Id. at 862.
47. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740–41 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (mem. op.).
48. Id. at 743 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (holding
that the NCAA’s television restrictions violated § 1 of the Sherman Act)).
49. Id. at 744 (citing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148–49 (5th Cir. 1977)).
50. Id. at 743.
51. Id. at 744 (citing Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1148–49).
52. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626–27 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
53. Id. at 625. The athlete relied “on NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2, which states that ‘[a] professional
athlete in one sport may represent a member institution in a different sport.’” Id. (alteration in
original).
54. Id. at 622.
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enrollment, the athlete secured various paid opportunities involving modeling,
television hosting, and product endorsements in the media, some of which were
associated with his image as an Olympic skier.55 When the NCAA refused to waive
its rules prohibiting student-athletes from earning compensation for use of their
NILs, the athlete sought an injunction on the grounds that such restrictions were
inapplicable to his skiing-related opportunities.56 Reading them as a whole, the
court concluded that the NCAA bylaws “express[ed] a clear and unambiguous
intent to prohibit student-athletes from engaging in [paid] endorsements.”57
Ultimately, the court favored the NCAA despite the NCAA’s inability to interpret
its own rules when asked to do so,58 and despite evidence that the athlete’s
endorsement opportunities were the product of his appearance and on-camera
presence, not his athletic ability.59
Considering student-athletes have traditionally been unsuccessful in
challenging the legality of restrictive NCAA bylaws on antitrust grounds, some
have attempted to argue they are entitled to compensation under labor and
employment laws.60 Regardless of the approach—whether suing under worker’s
compensation laws, the National Labor Relations Act, or the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA)—a majority of courts have rejected this argument.61 For instance, in
Berger v. NCAA, former competitors for the University of Pennsylvania’s women’s
track and field team sued their school, the NCAA, and 120 other NCAA Division
I universities and colleges, alleging that student-athletes are “employees” within
the meaning of the FLSA and therefore entitled to minimum wage.62 In rejecting
this claim, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the multifactor test it cited as
determinative in discerning the nature of employment relationships in previous
cases.63 According to the court, the established multifactor test failed to
accommodate the longstanding tradition of amateurism that defined the
economic reality of the relationship at issue, and thus was “not a ‘helpful guide.’”64
Rather, the court reasoned that student-athletes have committed a “tremendous”
amount of time to their respective NCAA sports for over a hundred years with no
expectation of pay and for reasons wholly unrelated to compensation, ultimately
holding that “play” therefore did not constitute “work” within the meaning of the
FLSA.65
Concurring, Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton emphasized that, while the
amateurism principle pointed toward dismissal in Berger because the plaintiffs
were not recipients of athletic scholarships and they competed in a non-revenue55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 626.
58. Id. at 627.
59. Id.
60. See Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate Student-Athlete
and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 287, 294–97 (2016).
61. Id. at 297.
62. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2016).
63. Id. at 291.
64. Id. (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)).
65. Id. at 293.
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generating sport, “economic reality and the tradition of amateurism may not point
in the same direction” with regard to scholarship athletes in Division I sports that
generate billions of dollars in revenue.66 Essentially, Judge Hamilton made clear
that a different set of facts might require the court to afford “room for further
debate” on the issue of whether student-athletes may be considered employees for
FLSA purposes.67
B. SHIFTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE: JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM TOWARD AMATEURISM
As the above cases demonstrate, courts have deferred to amateurism in a variety
of legal contexts despite the fact that the principle does not actually carry the force
of law.68 However, a 2015 landmark case questioned the validity of the principle
from both a legal and practical perspective,69 ultimately finding the NCAA’s
commitment to preserving the amateur nature of college sports an insufficient
justification for prohibiting student-athletes from being compensated for use of
their NILs.70 The landmark case was filed by Ed O’Bannon, a former AllAmerican basketball player from the University of California Los Angeles
(UCLA), who served as lead plaintiff in the class-action suit after realizing he had
been depicted in a college basketball video game produced by Electronic Arts
without his consent.71 Though a character in the video game resembled
O’Bannon in every detailed aspect down to the number on his UCLA jersey, the
player never authorized the use of his likeness nor was he ever compensated for
it.72 O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company, which
licenses the trademarks of the NCAA and its member schools, on the grounds
that amateurism rules preventing student-athletes from being compensated for use
of their NILs placed an illegal restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman Act.73
Judge Claudia Wilken of the Northern District of California agreed with
O’Bannon, ultimately concluding the NCAA’s prohibition on compensation
constituted a “price-fixing agreement” in which member colleges collectively
agreed to value their athletes’ likenesses at zero.74 In dismissing amateurism and
consumer demand as insufficient justifications for barring student-athletes from
receiving monetary compensation for NIL rights, Judge Wilken noted the NCAA
had altered its definition of amateurism over time in order to suit its own
interests,75 and that other factors, including “school loyalty and geography,” were
more determinative of consumer demand for college sports than the fact that
players are not compensated.76 To the extent that a total ban on student-athlete
66. Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
67. Id.
68. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2015).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1079.
71. Id. at 1055.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
75. Id. at 1000.
76. Id. at 1001; see also John Niemeyer, The End of an Era: The Mounting Challenges to the NCAA’s
Model of Amateurism, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 916–17 (2015) (summarizing the O’Bannon litigation).
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compensation may breed certain procompetitive effects such as academic
integration, Judge Wilken concluded the NCAA’s procompetitive objectives
could be preserved equally as well by less-restrictive alternatives, such as allowing
athletes to receive deferred stipends through a trust system.77
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that NCAA rules
prohibiting student-athlete compensation for use of NIL are anticompetitive in
effect and that the organization’s objectives could be accomplished by less
restrictive means.78 The NCAA attempted to rebut this conclusion by arguing that
amateurism has a procompetitive effect in broadening student-athletes’ options,
giving them the only opportunity they will have to play competitive sports while
earning an education.79 The Ninth Circuit disposed of this counterargument,
concluding that whether NCAA restrictions broadened educational opportunities
was irrelevant to the issue at bar.80 If anything, the court noted, loosening or
abandoning compensation rules might actually be the best way to accomplish the
goal of broadening student-athletes’ choices, considering “athletes might well be
more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that they were
earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”81
At the same time, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
acknowledgment that amateurism breeds procompetitive effects to the extent it
preserves the popularity of the NCAA’s product and integrates academics with
athletics.82 Yet, the Ninth Circuit deviated from the lower court’s understanding
of how these objectives might be accomplished through “less restrictive means,”
holding that allowing member institutions to offer student-athletes cash payments
“untethered to educational expenses” would go too far.83 “[I]n finding that paying
students cash compensation would promote amateurism as well as not paying
them,” the court stated, “the district court ignored that not paying student-athletes
is precisely what makes them amateurs.”84 To preserve the line between amateur
sports and minor league status that allows the college athletics industry to survive,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision only to the extent it
required the NCAA to allow member institutions to compensate their athletes
directly through deferred cash payments unrelated to educational expenses.85
Therefore, under O’Bannon, the NCAA’s bylaws violate antitrust principles
insofar as they prohibit athletes from earning NIL compensation altogether, but
the NCAA is still authorized to prohibit member institutions from paying athletes
beyond the cost of attendance.86
The O’Bannon decision is not only remarkable due to its authorization of
student-athlete NIL compensation, but also for its skeptical discussion as to
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005–06.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074, 1079.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1072–73.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1076–79.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1079.

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

66

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 74:55

whether amateurism should carry weight in a legal sense.87 For example, one of
the NCAA’s primary defenses in the O’Bannon litigation was based on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.88
In that case, the Court struck down the NCAA’s then-prevailing rules governing
television broadcasting of college football games, but it also noted that with
respect to the organization’s “critical role in the maintenance of a revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports,” the NCAA was deserving of “ample
latitude to play that role” because the tradition might die otherwise.89 The NCAA
relied heavily on this language in defending its restrictive bylaws prohibiting
student-athlete compensation in O’Bannon, arguing the Court’s directive in Board
of Regents had the effect of declaring amateurism rules “valid as a matter of law.”90
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, pointing out that the Supreme Court had merely
deemed NCAA rules not illegal per se and, thus, deserving of the somewhat
scrutinizing Rule of Reason standard of review where price-fixing is at issue.91 If
anything, according to the O’Bannon court, the Board of Regents decision
demonstrates that “not every rule adopted by the NCAA that restricts the market
is necessary to preserving the ‘character’ of college sports,”92 thereby undermining
the deferential perspective from which courts have traditionally assessed NCAA
bylaws.93
Sensing the favorable legal climate in the Ninth Circuit in light of O’Bannon,
student-athletes again tested the theory that they were entitled to compensation
as employees in accordance with the definitions provided by state and federal
labor laws. In 2017, a football player from the University of Southern California
(USC) represented NCAA Division I football players in a class-action suit against
the NCAA and the PAC-12 athletic conference of which USC is a member.94 The
player alleged that he was entitled to minimum wage as an employee of the NCAA
and PAC-12, yet was denied pay for all hours worked plus overtime.95 While the
player attempted to invoke the Berger concurrence96 to argue that the status of
Division I football players was distinguishable from that of student-athletes
competing in non-revenue-generating sports, the court ultimately found that the
weight of both case law and administrative interpretation supported the opposite
conclusion.97 Citing the Department of Labor’s handbook, the court explained
that collegiate sports do not constitute “work” under the FLSA because such
activities are tied to education, and therefore primarily intended to benefit the
87. See id. at 1061–64.
88. See id. at 1061.
89. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
90. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061–63.
91. Id. at 1063.
92. Id. at 1074.
93. See, e.g., Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen an NCAA bylaw
is clearly meant to help maintain the ‘revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ or the
‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher education,’ the bylaw will be presumed procompetitive
. . . .”).
94. Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 402–03 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
95. Id. at 403.
96. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J., concurring).
97. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406.
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participant.98 Holding that no employment relationship exists between studentathletes and the NCAA—regardless of whether the player participates in a revenuegenerating or non-revenue-generating sport—the court concluded that the
“plaintiff [was] looking for O’Bannon to carry a weight it cannot shoulder,” because
there is simply no legal basis for defining student-athletes as employees under the
FLSA.99
Despite the limited reach of O’Bannon in the context of employment law,
however, student-athletes have made significant progress towards securing
academic benefits beyond the cost of attendance. As of April 2021, the NCAA v.
Alston plaintiffs currently await decision by the United States Supreme Court on
the issue of whether NCAA restrictions on the receipt of “non-cash educationrelated benefits,” violate the Sherman Act.100 Whereas O’Bannon established the
right of member institutions to offer full cost-of-attendance scholarships to
student-athletes, the “benefits” at issue in Alston consist of items including
“computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other items not
included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the
pursuit of various academic studies.”101 Judge Claudia Wilken once again ruled
against the NCAA at the district court level102 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
May 2020, agreeing that “caps on non-cash, education-related benefits have no
demand-preserving effect and, therefore, lack a procompetitive justification.”103
While the Alston case is not directly related to the debate surrounding athletes’
NIL rights, the Supreme Court’s possible rejection of amateurism as a legitimate
claim for denying compensation threatens to upend the NCAA’s enforcement
power, not to mention its business model.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF O’BANNON: NEW LEGISLATION
PERMITTING STUDENT-ATHLETE COMPENSATION
In scrutinizing the NCAA’s motivations for perpetuating its restrictive bylaws—
and questioning the validity of the amateurism principle overall—the Ninth
Circuit paved the way for dramatic measures favoring the rights of student-athletes
to be introduced through the legislature. O’Bannon also worked to generate public
support for the notion that athletes deserve compensation for use of their NIL,104
with celebrities at the forefront of the case bringing attention to the issue in public
interviews. For instance, along with Ed O’Bannon himself, LeBron James,
DeMaurice Smith, and Bernie Sanders enthusiastically advocated for the passage
98. Id. at 406–07.
99. Id. at 408.
100. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1104 (N.D.
Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 1231
(2020).
101. Id. at 1088.
102. Id. at 1110.
103. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d at 1257–58.
104. See Hillary Hughes & Erika Johnson, Fair Pay to Play Act: Legislation Allowing NCAA Athlete
Compensation Signed into Law by California Gov. Gavin Newsom, JD SUPRA (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fair-pay-to-play-act-legislation-17188/ [https://perma.cc/GJG8W98B].
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of legislation permitting student-athletes to be compensated for use of their NIL
in the wake of O’Bannon.105
A. CALIFORNIA’S FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT
The California legislature quickly took advantage of the momentum
surrounding the issue of student-athlete compensation, passing Senate Bill 206,
otherwise known as the Fair Pay to Play Act, in September 2019.106 The Fair Pay
to Play Act extends the O’Bannon ruling to its logical end, establishing the right
of student-athletes to earn compensation from commercial use of their names,
images, and likenesses, as well as the right to hire licensed agents and other athlete
representatives for assistance in securing and negotiating endorsement
opportunities.107 While the Act directly defies the amateurism principle to which
the NCAA remains committed,108 it does not go so far as to allow colleges and
universities to pay their athletes directly109 and thus reflects current labor and
employment jurisprudence.110 Rather, the law prohibits universities from
interfering with commercial opportunities that enable athletes to profit from use
of their NILs, except where such endorsements would conflict with preexisting
school sponsorships.111
The Fair Pay to Play Act received overwhelming bipartisan support from
lawmakers, with the California Senate voting in favor of the bill 31 to 5 and the
Assembly unanimously favoring the bill 73 to 0.112 On September 30, 2019,
California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill 206 into law during an
appearance on HBO’s “The Shop” hosted by LeBron James.113 The Fair Pay to
Play Act will not take effect until January 1, 2023,114 providing ample time for
more legal developments on the issue of student-athlete compensation, which may
include the passage of similar laws in other states, litigation initiated by the NCAA
or colleges and universities in states declining to adopt such legislation, or even
preemption in the form of a comprehensive federal law.
B. CALIFORNIA SPARKS A TREND: PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES
Immediately following the passage of California’s Act, legislators across the
country garnered support for the passage of similar laws in a number of other
105. Id.
106. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(a), (c) (West 2019).
107. See id.
108. Amateurism, supra note 38.
109. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(b).
110. See, e.g., Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
111. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(e).
112. Michael McCann, What’s Next After California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to Play Act Into
Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/30/fair-pay-toplay-act-law-ncaa-california-pac-12 [https://perma.cc/H55B-HJVH].
113. Erik Garcia Gundersen, California Governor Gavin Newsom Signs Fair Pay to Play Act Alongside
LeBron
on
‘The
Shop’,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
30,
2019,
11:12
AM),
https://lebronwire.usatoday.com/2019/09/30/california-governor-gavin-newsom-signs-fair-pay-toplay-act-alongside-lebron-on-the-shop/ [https://perma.cc/5TB4-A3R7].
114. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(h).
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states.115 Already, state representatives from Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee have begun advocating for,
drafting, and proposing bills that would allow student-athletes to be compensated
for use of their NILs.116 Legislators in Colorado and Florida acted with even
greater urgency, successfully passing new state laws mirroring California’s during
their 2020 sessions.117
While the inspiration for proposed NIL legislation in a number of states
originated with the Fair Pay to Play Act, certain bills contain unique components
providing solutions to anticipated problems not addressed in California’s law. For
instance, like the California Act, a proposed bill in New Jersey purports to allow
student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their NILs without impacting
scholarship eligibility, though it would also place limitations on athletes’ ability to
partake in endorsements to the extent their NIL is used in connection with “adult
entertainment, alcohol, gambling, tobacco and electronic smoking,
pharmaceuticals, controlled dangerous substances or firearms.”118 A Florida state
representative proposed a similar bill, though added a provision for the creation
of a “Florida College System Athlete Name, Image, & Likeness Task Force” to
oversee athletes’ endorsements.119 Interestingly, the Florida bill has since been
signed into law and will take effect during the summer of 2021,120 meaning the
NCAA’s timeline for preempting a state-by-state movement—and the window for
constructing an effective solution at the federal level—has been dramatically
condensed despite California’s law remaining dormant until 2023.
At least two states are attempting to extend athletes’ compensation rights
beyond NIL, introducing legislation that would require colleges to pay their
athletes directly for participation. New York’s bill proposes dividing 15% of the
revenue generated from athletic ticket sales at all NCAA schools in New York
among student-athletes.121 Further, the bill contains a provision compelling
115. Carroll, supra note 6.
116. Id.; Nicole Berkowitz, Susan Russell, Samuel Strantz & Baker Donelson, More States Step Up
to the Plate with New Legislation to Address Student Athlete Compensation and the NCAA Passes the Ball to
Congress, JD SUPRA (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/more-states-step-up-to-theplate-with-96795/ [https://perma.cc/78RT-TR7T]; Kevin Harden, Pay College Athletes? Oregon’s
Taking
up
the
Issue
Again,
E.
OREGONIAN
(Apr.
2,
2021),
https://www.eastoregonian.com/townnews/law/pay-college-athletes-oregons-taking-up-the-issueagain/article_2868ed0a-926b-11eb-b7ad-4bfa3ae4e9c0.html [https://perma.cc/VY4B-CE2W].
117. Dan Murphy, Florida Name, Image, Likeness Bill Now a Law; State Athletes Can Profit from
Endorsements Next Summer, ESPN (June 12, 2020), https://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-name-image-likeness-bill-now-law-meaning-state-athletes-profitendorsements-next-summer [https://perma.cc/WA25-2WHZ].
118. Gregg Clifton, New Jersey Joins the Growing Number of States Seeking to Create Name, Image and
Likeness Rights for Student Athletes in Direct Defiance of Current NCAA Bylaws, JD SUPRA (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-jersey-joins-the-growing-number-of-34464/
[https://perma.cc/3U57-JFQ3].
119. Charlotte Carroll, Florida Rep Proposes Bill Compensating College Athletes for Names, Likeness,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/01/florida-staterepresentative-proposed-legislation-pay-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/V4VU-GK25].
120. Murphy, supra note 117.
121. Jabari Young, Florida and NY Push Bills to Compete with California’s NCAA ‘Pay to Play’ Law,
CNBC (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/florida-and-ny-push-bills-to-
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colleges to create and fund “injured athlete” accounts that would financially
compensate athletes who suffer career-ending or long-term injuries.122 In South
Carolina, lawmakers have proposed legislation that would require the state’s
colleges and universities to pay student-athletes participating in revenuegenerating sports a $5,000 annual stipend.123
C. THE NCAA’S REACTION TO NEW LEGISLATION
In the immediate wake of the Fair Pay to Play Act’s passage, the collegiate sports
industry did not jump on board with the notion that student-athletes deserve
compensation for use of their NILs. Larry Scott, the head commissioner for the
PAC-12 athletic conference, commented that he believed the Act would “lead to
the professionalization of college sports and many unintended consequences.”124
Gene Smith, Ohio State University’s athletic director, threatened that he would
refuse to schedule games against any California schools should the California law
remain unchanged by the date of its implementation in 2023.125 Even Mark
Emmert, the president of the NCAA, argued the law would devastate the college
sports industry by giving certain schools a distinct advantage in attracting talent,
drawing attention away from non-revenue-generating sports, and rendering
athletes employees.126 Given these potential consequences and their negative
impact on the principle of amateurism, Mark Emmert threatened to exclude
colleges and universities in California from competing in the NCAA
championships altogether.127
However, the speed and enthusiasm with which proposals for state laws
mimicking California’s Fair Pay to Play Act materialized undoubtedly put pressure
on the NCAA to adjust its position. In fact, the NCAA was forced to accept reality
toward the end of October 2019, at which point the organization’s top governing
board unanimously voted to permit student-athletes to benefit from the use of
their NILs, though “in a manner consistent with the collegiate model.”128
Following the vote, the NCAA publicized its new stance in a post to its website
compete-with-californias-ncaa-pay-to-play-law.html [https://perma.cc/TS5F-DFTN]; Gregg Clifton,
New York Senate Bill to Require Student Athletes to Share in University Ticket Revenue, JD SUPRA (Sept. 23,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-senate-bill-to-require-student-76744/
[https://perma.cc/FY6E-JUWU].
122. Clifton, supra note 121.
123. Jenna West, South Carolina Lawmakers to File Proposal Similar to California’s Fair Pay to Play
Act, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/13/southcarolina-proposal-pay-college-athletes-fair-pay-play-act [https://perma.cc/KS6Q-U9YM].
124. Tyler Tynes, The Ripple Effects of California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play’ Act, THE RINGER (Oct. 11,
2019, 6:55 AM), https://www.theringer.com/2019/10/11/20909171/california-sb-206-ncaa-paycollege-players [https://perma.cc/35VT-VSRB].
125. Id.
126. Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay to Play Act Will Allow Student Athletes to Receive
Compensation,
FORBES
(Oct.
1,
2019,
12:36
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/10/01/in-a-revolutionary-change-newly-passedcalifornia-fair-pay-to-play-act-will-allow-student-athletes-to-receive-compensation/#7d58834257d0
[https://perma.cc/4UXF-4UWR].
127. Id.
128. Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, supra note
7.

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021] A Call to Eradicate NCAA Monopsony Through Federal Legislation

71

that vaguely summarized the Board’s decision.129 Board member Michael V.
Drake is quoted, ambiguously remarking that the NCAA “must embrace change
to provide the best possible experience for college athletes.”130 The NCAA stated
its intent to continue gathering feedback on “how best to respond to the state and
federal legislative environment” through April 2020, and asked each of its
divisions to create any new rules by January 2021.131 However, the NCAA
indefinitely halted consideration of all proposed rules in January 2021 in response
to a letter from the Department of Justice warning of potential antitrust
violations.132 Thus, even if the NCAA’s shift in tone since the introduction of the
Fair Pay to Play Act signifies a willingness to cooperate, it remains unclear whether
the organization will fulfill its promise to bolster the rights of student-athletes
through permissive NIL policies.
V. ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF NEW STATE
LEGISLATION
Moving forward, implementing a workable student-athlete compensation
policy that colleges and universities, the NCAA, and student-athletes themselves
are willing to comply with presents a formidable task. With only a few months left
to contemplate its new regulatory scheme before numerous state laws take effect,
the possibility that the NCAA will place major restrictions on the rights
articulated in the Fair Pay to Play Act, or even mount a legal challenge against any
or all of the new state laws, remains conceivable. Moreover, colleges and
universities in states without Fair Pay to Play legislation may have legitimate
grievances worthy of judicial intervention that could halt efforts to improve the
rights of student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their NILs. Irrespective
of potential roadblocks, the advantages to be gained from revolutionizing the
college sports industry so as to prioritize the rights of hardworking student-athletes
over those of wealthy corporations far outweighs the practical and legal challenges
that inevitably accompany this lofty goal. Therefore, a comprehensive solution in
the form of federal legislation, which accounts for the nuances and questions left
unanswered by state legislation, must prevail.
A. LEGAL CHALLENGES THREATEN TO FORESTALL THE EXPANSION OF
STUDENT-ATHLETES’ COMPENSATION RIGHTS
As with any controversial new law, the possibility that legal challenges will
subdue or eliminate the effects of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act and affiliated
legislation remains possible. The media has long suspected that the NCAA plans
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Student-Athlete Committees Issue Joint Statement on Name, Image, Likeness Legislation Delay, supra
note 9; Sarah Polus, NCAA Tables Name, Image and Likeness Vote After DOJ Warns of Potential Antitrust
Violations, THE HILL (Jan. 12, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/533830-ncaasuspends-name-image-and-likeness-vote-after-doj-warns-ofpotential#:~:text=In%20the%20original%20DOJ%20letter,trademarks%20and%20logos%20and
%20more [https://perma.cc/W6JF-LE3B].

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

72

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 74:55

to launch some sort of judicial attack aimed at preserving amateurism in college
sports, given the fury with which Mark Emmert promptly responded to the
announcement of California’s Act.133 While it is true the organization has publicly
adjusted its stance with regard to student-athlete compensation for endorsements,
there is no updated timeline for when the NCAA will adopt official regulations
governing the matter.134 Discrepancies between the NCAA’s understanding of
appropriate NIL rights compared to the potentially broader rights provided by
states may give rise to not only litigation, but unworkable conflict.135 In addition,
colleges and universities—and potentially the regional athletic conferences of
which they are members—not benefitting from the passage of legislation similar to
the Fair Pay to Play Act will likely be inclined to sue in light of the distinct
recruiting advantages colleges in states adopting such legislation will gain. While
a number of actors may likewise attempt to challenge the legality of the Fair Pay
to Play Act and other laws, potential suits initiated by the NCAA or colleges and
universities in the majority of states without such legislation are the most
threatening.
1. Diminishment of Student-Athletes’ Monetization Opportunities by the NCAA Itself
Since the passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act, the NCAA has publicly expressed
a willingness to adjust its bylaws so as to accommodate new policies permitting
student-athletes to earn NIL compensation.136 Yet, it remains unclear whether the
organization is serious about this commitment, considering NCAA leadership
continues to describe its new strategy in ambiguous terms that could be
interpreted as merely rebranding amateurism. For instance, the NCAA’s Board of
Governors established “guiding principles” at the start of its discussions regarding
new policies in October 2019, which include the following: “maintain[ing] the
priorities of education and the collegiate experience”; making a “clear distinction
between collegiate and professional opportunities”; making clear that
“compensation for athletics performance or participation is impermissible”;
reaffirming that “student-athletes are students first and not employees of the
university”; enhancing “diversity, inclusion and gender equity”; and protecting
the recruiting process.137 Given the NCAA’s persistent emphasis on these same
tenets of amateurism throughout history, it is unclear whether the organization
will enact regulations permitting student-athletes to engage in activities
133. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, California Wants its College Athletes to Get Paid, but the NCAA is
Likely
to
Put
Up
Hurdles,
CNN
(Oct.
2,
2019,
9:00
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/01/us/california-sb206-ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-act/index.html
[https://perma.cc/WC8N-R27E].
134. See Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, supra
note 7; Student-Athlete Committees Issue Joint Statement on Name, Image, Likeness Legislation Delay, supra
note 9.
135. Dan Murphy, Everything You Need to Know About the NCAA’s NIL Debate, ESPN (Apr. 8,
2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31086019/everything-need-know-ncaa-nildebate [https://perma.cc/T8XE-B642].
136. See,
e.g.,
Taking
Action:
Name,
Image,
and
Likeness,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/taking-action [https://perma.cc/JT35-QHL2].
137. Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, supra note
7.
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traditionally reserved for professional sports, such as hiring agents as allowed
under the Fair Pay to Play Act.138 At least in theory, permitting such activities
would seem to directly contradict the principle of amateurism or—as the NCAA
now calls it—maintaining a “clear distinction between collegiate and professional
opportunities.”139
Further, statements by NCAA leadership reflect hesitation toward permissive
bylaws. For instance, NCAA board member Michael V. Drake claims that
“modernization” is workable as a “natural extension of the numerous steps NCAA
members have taken in recent years to improve support for student-athletes,
including full cost of attendance and guaranteed scholarships.”140 While the
statement signals an awareness on the part of NCAA leadership that some level
of modernization is unavoidable, permitting athletes to be paid for endorsement
opportunities completely unrelated to their education represents a drastic leap
from a policy guaranteeing scholarships. This stark reality is reflected in a second
quote by Mr. Drake from the NCAA website, stating that “[a]llowing promotions
and third-party endorsements is uncharted territory.”141 Taken as a whole, these
statements suggest not that the NCAA has “bowed down under pressure” as some
believe,142 but rather that the organization is appeasing lawmakers and the public,
while in the meantime formulating next steps that will effectively undermine new
legislation perceived as violating its time-honored amateurism principles.
Especially now that voting sessions on proposed bylaws are halted indefinitely,143
the NCAA’s strategy is more ambiguous than ever.
If the NCAA opts to challenge the legality of the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar
legislation in court, it is likely to do so on interstate commerce grounds, arguing
that compliance will be made burdensome or impossible because the state laws at
issue contain a number of unique and conflicting provisions. In one statement
following the passage of California’s law, the NCAA hinted at this possibility by
stating that “a patchwork of different laws from different states will make
unattainable the goal of providing a fair and level playing field for 1,100 campuses
and nearly half a million student-athletes nationwide.”144 Thus, even though the
NCAA has signaled its willingness to comply with state laws permitting athletes
to receive compensation for endorsement deals on some level, the fact that certain
states may enact legislation authorizing compensation beyond the realm of NIL
may be problematic from a compliance standpoint. For instance, proposed
legislation in both New York and South Carolina purports to require colleges

7.

138. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(c) (West 2019).
139. Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, supra note

140. Id.
141. Taking Action: Name, Image, and Likeness, supra note 136.
142. Roxanne Jones, The NCAA Blinked, and It’s About Time, CNN (Oct. 30, 2019, 10:44 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/30/opinions/ncaa-athlete-compensation-fair-pay-to-play-actjones/index.html [https://perma.cc/N8UU-TJ25].
143. Student-Athlete Committees Issue Joint Statement on Name, Image, Likeness Legislation Delay, supra
note 9.
144. NCAA Statement on Gov. Newsom Signing SB 206, NCAA (Sept. 30, 2019, 10:44 AM),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-gov-newsom-signing-sb206 [https://perma.cc/WFK3-CPFR].
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themselves to pay student-athletes directly for their performances under certain
circumstances, which obviously violates the NCAA’s current policy on
amateurism145 and may even constitute a legal employment relationship. Even if
the NCAA were forced to accept the notion that some student-athletes will
technically be made employees under new state laws, the organization would
struggle to create a comprehensive set of rules that accommodate such variances
while maintaining a level playing field for its member institutions in the context
of recruiting.146 The NCAA can only fulfill its mission of facilitating fair
competition when all of its member institutions are governed by the same set of
regulations, otherwise certain schools will gain distinct advantages over others.
2. Lawsuits by Colleges and Universities Not Benefitting from New State Laws
The inevitable discriminatory effect the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar
legislation will have on the collegiate recruiting process likewise presents fertile
ground for potential legal challenges. While legislation permitting college athletes
to receive compensation for NIL is already under consideration in a number of
states, the majority of states have yet to initiate similar proposals.147 Thus, once
the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar laws go into effect, only athletes in those
respective states will be able to profit from lending their images to video game
publishers, serving as instructors at sponsored summer camps, and negotiating
endorsement deals with an array of commercial entities ranging from sports
beverage companies to car dealerships.148 Colleges and universities in states that
have adopted these laws will undoubtedly gain a leg up in attracting high school
athletes with the ability to promise not only athletic scholarships, but also
compensation from lucrative identity-rights deals.149 While that competitive
advantage is one reason several states have already followed California’s lead,
passing similar legislation may come with more obstacles in certain states whose
legislatures are less progressive in this context.150
In order to circumvent potential discrimination in the recruiting process,
colleges and universities in states without legislation permitting student-athlete
compensation may launch a legal attack against existing state laws having that
effect. The dormant commerce clause provides an attractive theory under which
these institutions may succeed.151 Generally, the dormant commerce clause
prohibits state legislatures from passing laws which have a discriminatory effect
on the economies of other states.152 By invoking this principle, colleges and

145. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.
146. McCann, supra note 112.
147. See Carroll, supra note 6.
148. McCann, supra note 112.
149. Michael McCann, California’s New Law Worries the NCAA, but a Federal Law is What They
Should Fear, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/04/ncaafair-pay-to-play-act-name-likeness-image-laws [https://perma.cc/YV26-SHRQ].
150. Id.
151. McCann, supra note 112; see also David Cruikshank, The Fair Pay to Play Act: Likely
Unconstitutional, Yet Necessary to Protect Athletes, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 253, 261–64 (2020).
152. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
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universities may be successful in arguing that state laws like the Fair Pay to Play
Act aim to provide their own states’ schools a competitive advantage over those
in other states and therefore should be invalidated.153 Whether states elect to
challenge these new laws likely depends on the NCAA’s ultimate stance on
permitting compensation for endorsements, but as the NCAA struggles to adopt
updated polices and more states begin drafting and considering new bills, the
dormant commerce clause may be an effective tool for alleviating competitive
imbalances in recruiting in the meantime.
B. OVERCOMING POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES AND PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
In light of the legal mechanisms by which the NCAA and collegiate institutions
may successfully defeat a state-by-state approach to expanding the rights of studentathletes, a comprehensive federal law may be the only viable method for
accomplishing such an objective.154 However, the passage of a federal law
permitting student-athletes to be compensated for endorsements could transform
the entire college athletics industry in a way that a majority of states have not yet
expressed a willingness to support. Therefore, greater consideration for the overall
effects of passing a law similar to the Fair Pay to Play Act on a national scale is
warranted. In balancing the advantages and drawbacks of allowing studentathletes to financially benefit from their NIL, this Comment aims to demonstrate
that the social and economic benefits to result from such a policy far outweigh the
potential negative consequences. Because the movement in favor of a federal
solution is justifiable, Congress should seriously consider the passage of a federal
law that echoes the general principles the Fair Pay to Play Act encompasses, while
addressing certain practical issues state legislators overlooked.
1. Social and Economic Benefits to be Gained from Expanding the Rights of StudentAthletes
a. Providing Monetization Opportunities as a Matter of Basic Fairness
The primary argument driving the rapid passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act, and
perhaps the reason state legislators intuitively supported the bill, was that of basic
economic fairness.155 State representatives in California pointed to the fact that
every other college student with a talent or skill has the right to earn compensation
from marketing themselves through social media and endorsement deals.156 For
example, collegiate musicians may benefit financially from selling their music on
streaming platforms such as Spotify and iTunes, playing concerts, and selling their
own merchandise, regardless of whether they also receive scholarship money to
153. See id. at 477.
154. See Note, Benjamin Feiner, Setting the Edge: How the NCAA Can Defend Amateurism by
Allowing Third-Party Compensation, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 93, 113 (2020).
155. Lee Green, Impact of California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’ on High School Athletes, NAT’L FED’N OF
ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.nfhs.org/articles/impact-of-california-s-fair-payto-play-act-on-high-school-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/DK3D-SBW8].
156. Id.
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perform with their school’s marching band, orchestra, or theater department.157
Moreover, within the college sports industry itself, athletes are grossly
undercompensated compared to those who manage and regulate sporting
competitions and ultimately profit from the labor of student-athletes. The
University of Alabama’s head football coach, Nick Saban, earned a whopping $8.8
million in 2019 alone, with most SEC football coaches earning upwards of $3
million as well.158 Executives for athletic conferences and the NCAA are even
more well-paid than coaches in some instances; the NCAA’s Mark Emmert made
$3.9 million in 2018.159 From a fairness perspective, the notion that corporate
leaders and coaches—none of whom actually compete in the sports from which
they profit—are earning millions of dollars while the athletes whose labor
generates that profit are limited to scholarship funding, seems inherently
problematic.
The argument that athletes deserve to be paid as a matter of basic fairness is
even more compelling given the statistics on student-athlete poverty. According
to a study conducted by the National College Players Association, 85% of studentathletes, including those receiving scholarship money, live below the poverty
line.160 Yet, given the astronomical cost of college tuition, it may seem
counterintuitive to argue that student-athletes are taken advantage of in only
receiving a scholarship.161 Critics who oppose compensating student-athletes
claim not only that scholarships are extremely valuable in their own right, but also
that permitting a student to be compensated solely for athletic prowess
“undermin[es] the value of . . . a highly discounted education.”162 However, these
criticisms overlook reality and the obvious need for a more permissive policy on
student-athlete compensation.
Realistically, athletic scholarships do little to assist impoverished studentathletes during their college years or once they graduate. Some athletes in the
NCAA’s Divisions I and II do receive full scholarships, but the average NCAA
athletic scholarship only provides $10,409 to $14,270 annually,163 and Division

157. Id.
158. David Ching, SEC Stands out in Conference-by-Conference FBS Salary Comparison, FORBES (Oct.
23, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidching/2019/10/23/sec-stands-out-inconference-by-conference-fbs-salary-comparison/?sh=7744494b2b03
[https://perma.cc/BC9RQAA9].
159. Jeff Faraudo, Cal Athletics: It’s Time for the NCAA to Check the Calendar - It’s the 21st Century,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/cal/news/cal-athletics-its-time-forthe-ncaa-to-check-the-calendar-its-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/T8JS-CRTJ].
160. Study: “The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sport”, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N (Sept. 13,
2011),
https://www.ncpanow.org/research/study-the-price-of-poverty-in-big-time-college-sport
[https://perma.cc/JDZ8-EBAK].
161. Rodger Sherman, The Fair Pay to Play Act Has Been Signed. Now the NCAA Must Address a
Question to Which It’s Never Had a Good Answer, THE RINGER (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:38 AM),
https://www.theringer.com/2019/10/1/20892842/fair-pay-to-play-act-college-sports-california-lawgavin-newsom [https://perma.cc/L44X-WAAP].
162. Adam H. Koblenz, The Whole Nine Yards: Should Student-Athletes Score an Education and
Compensation?, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 37, 50 (2017).
163. Wes Gerrie, More Than Just the Game: How Colleges and the NCAA Are Violating Their StudentAthletes’ Rights of Publicity, 18 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 111, 117 (2018).
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III athletes are ineligible for athletic scholarships in any amount.164 The 53% of
student-athletes who are able to receive some level of financial aid from athletics
are required to dedicate that funding toward the cost of tuition, room and board,
books, and transportation to class.165 As a result, athletes are commonly unable to
afford out-of-pocket expenses, especially in light of the fact that their weekly
schedules would not accommodate a part-time job even if NCAA rules permitted
it.166 Also, athletes who suffer career-ending injuries not only struggle to pay
medical bills, but also are often forced to drop out of their college or university
because they are no longer able to cover tuition without the assistance of an
athletic scholarship.167 Of those athletes who avoid an injury and happen to
compete in one of the six NCAA sports for which a professional league exists,
only 2% are able to monetize their talent by playing professionally after college.168
As for the other 98%, they graduate without a future in the field they have
dedicated endless time and effort to during their college years, without having
ever been compensated for a single practice, game, or endorsement, and without
the benefit of having properly focused on academic progress and career
development. Ultimately, the Fair Pay to Play Act and similar laws represent a
positive societal shift toward recognizing student-athletes as uniquely talented
individuals who not only deserve to profit from use of their likeness as a marketing
tool, but also to excel as athletes without the brunt of poverty impacting their
experience during college.
b. Equalizing Opportunity for Athletes Competing in Sports Without
Professional Leagues
Legislation permitting student-athletes to benefit financially from use of their
NILs will breed greater equality in college sports by allowing athletes who compete
in non-revenue-generating sports to earn compensation, where doing so would
otherwise be impossible at any point in their athletic careers. Whereas NCAA
regulations have prohibited all student-athletes—including men’s football and
basketball players, whose programs generate the most revenue—from earning NIL
compensation in the past, the possibility that valuable training in college athletics
will translate into multi-million dollar professional contracts has been available
only to a limited class of athletes competing in one of the six sports for which a
professional league exists.169 Some argue that permitting student-athletes to be
compensated for NIL through a policy similar to the Fair Pay to Play Act will only
164. List of NCAA Division 3 Schools, ATHNET, https://www.athleticscholarships.net/division-3colleges-schools.htm [https://perma.cc/53FE-X6Y6].
165. Gerrie, supra note 163, at 117.
166. See
id.;
How
Student-Athletes
Feel
About
Time
Demands,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017GOALS_Time_demands_20170628.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6BL-ZRX2].
167. Nicole Kline, Note, Bridging the NCAA’s Accident Insurance Coverage Gaps? A Deep Dive Into
the Uncertainties of Injury Coverage in College Contact Sports, and the Impact That Has on Athlete’s Future
Physical and Financial Comforts, 31 J.L. & HEALTH 55, 59 (2018).
168. NCAA
Recruiting
Facts,
NCAA
(Aug.
2020),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/recruiting/NCAA_RecruitingFactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GY9-ZMGC].
169. See id.

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

78

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 74:55

perpetuate this inequity, because men’s football and women’s volleyball players,
for example, will earn disproportionate income from paid endorsement deals.170
However, this argument, albeit probably correct, fails to provide a justification for
continuing to deny the right of compensation to athletes who compete in sports
that traditionally fail to generate revenue and lack lucrative post-graduate
opportunities.
The first-hand experiences of student-athletes forced to turn down an array of
opportunities for personal and career development demonstrate the need for
federal legislation permitting athlete compensation for use of NIL, even if its
effects ultimately do financially benefit some more than others. For instance,
UCLA gymnast Katelyn Ohashi passionately served as a co-sponsor on the Fair
Pay to Play Act after calling out the NCAA for her inability to profit from a video
of her record-breaking, perfect-ten floor routine that went viral following a
collegiate gymnastics meet.171 In addition to being denied the right to profit from
the video of her routine that was viewed over 100 million times online, Ohashi
was forced to turn down book deals and speaking engagements in order to
“preserve the amateur status that allowed her to stay on scholarship.”172 In light
of her obligation to reject these opportunities, Ohashi spoke out about feeling
“handcuffed” by restrictive policies that prevented her from deriving any financial
benefit from her own name and likeness, regardless of the fact that she had zero
opportunity to join a professional league following graduation.173 Ohashi’s story
demonstrates the positive impact federal legislation stripping the NCAA’s to
restrict student-athlete NIL compensation will have on athletes whose only
opportunities to earn money in recognition of extraordinary talent and work ethic
arise during their college years. The possibility that some athletes may not benefit
from such legislation at all, while others will benefit ten-fold compared to others,
is undeniable. Yet, the existence of such disparities is not a justification for
continuing to deny student-athletes the right to benefit from their NIL, especially
those whose individual marketability is inherently short-lived due to factors
outside their control.
c. Avoiding the Imposition of Affirmative Obligations on the Part of
Colleges and Universities
Another benefit of legislation permitting student-athletes to profit from NIL is
that such a policy leaves colleges and universities out of the controversy, allowing
them to dedicate revenue across athletic programs as needed while avoiding
violations of Title IX or the FLSA that may be implicated where schools are

170. Sherman, supra note 161.
171. Michelle R. Martinelli, Viral Former UCLA Gymnast Katelyn Ohashi Slams NCAA, Felt
‘Handcuffed’
by
Profit
Rules,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
9,
2019,
9:25
AM),
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2019/10/katelyn-ohashi-ucla-viral-gymnast-slams-ncaa-fair-pay-to-play
[https://perma.cc/4L64-M8AJ].
172. Andy Uhler, NCAA Getting Closer to Letting Student Athletes Cash in on Names and Likenesses,
MARKETPLACE (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/11/01/ncaa-getting-closer-toletting-student-athletes-cash-in-on-names-and-likenesses/ [https://perma.cc/YJ5B-KUCW].
173. Id.
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required to pay their athletes directly.174 Some criticize the Fair Pay to Play Act
and similar proposed legislation as undermining the purpose of Title IX by
facilitating unequal compensation as previously discussed, but Title IX would only
be implicated in a scenario where colleges were providing unequal funding to
athletes directly.175
By limiting the expansion of students’ rights to the realm of NIL, any legal
implications concerning misuse of federal funding will be avoided. Colleges and
universities, athletic conferences, and the NCAA will avoid legal challenges
arguing that this form of compensation renders student-athletes “employees” of
such institutions, given that any compensation the athletes earn will be the
product of negotiations with brands and sponsors not associated with the college
sports industry itself.176 Certain provisions in some proposed laws, such as the
New York bill requiring colleges to divide 15% of revenue from ticket sales among
student-athletes,177 may be viewed in a different light, however. Instead of
litigating whether such provisions violate federal requirements in a lengthy, stateby-state judicial process, the passage of a comprehensive federal law provides a
more effective means for delineating the outer limit of a workable policy on
student-athletes’ rights to compensation for use of their NILs.
d. Circumventing the “Amateurism” Excuse
The NCAA’s reliance on the principle of amateurism as a justification for
refusing to share its astronomical profits with those who generate them no longer
suffices to prevent student-athletes from earning compensation for use of their
NILs. For decades, courts blindly deferred to the NCAA’s assertion that the very
existence of collegiate athletics depended on the preservation of amateurism,
allowing the organization’s restrictive bylaws governing compensation to endure
without scrutiny.178 However, viewing amateurism as a veil behind which the
NCAA knowingly exploits student-athletes, student athletes and sports industry
critics alike have generated overwhelming opposition to those bylaws in light of
the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to defer to the principle in O’Bannon.179 Surely, the
NCAA’s recognition of shifting societal views regarding amateurism was a primary
174. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J., concurring); Jayma
Meyer & Andrew Zimbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes Get Paid for Their Names, Images, and Likenesses
and Colleges Maintain the Primacy of Academics, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 263–64 (2020).
175. Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 174, at 264–65, 287; Michael McCann, Key Questions,
Takeaways from the NCAA’s NIL Announcement, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/30/ncaa-name-image-likeness-announcement-takeawaysquestions [https://perma.cc/L2QD-QEBG].
176. McCann, supra note 175.
177. Young, supra note 121.
178. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (“[A]thletes
must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328,
342–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to help maintain the ‘revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports’ or the ‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher
education,’ the bylaw will be presumed procompetitive . . . .”).
179. See John Feinstein, California Did the Right Thing. Don’t Buy into the NCAA’s Propaganda,
WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/california-didthe-right-thing-dont-buy-into-the-ncaas-propaganda/2019/10/02/21ed7b14-e531-11e9-a3312df12d56a80b_story.html [https://perma.cc/F7TM-3XWZ].
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driver in its decision to consider adjusting its policies on compensation for
endorsements as discussed, but the possibility that the NCAA finds support in
amateurism remains to some extent, especially if NCAA v. Alston is decided in its
favor.
Even amidst an outpouring of criticism over the NCAA’s practices, some
athletes and scholars argue that quashing amateurism will result in the destruction
of a time-honored tradition that offers innumerable benefits to society.180 For
instance, former University of Florida college football player and Heisman Trophy
recipient Tim Tebow expressed his dissatisfaction with the Fair Pay to Play Act in
an interview, remarking that compensating players would change what makes
college football special and would effectively transform the sport into the NFL.181
Tebow further defended his belief on the grounds that sports should be about
following your dreams and supporting your teammates and institution without
concern for which team is willing to offer the most money.182
While Tebow’s commentary reflects the positive sentiments associated with
amateurism that enabled restrictive NCAA bylaws to circumvent scrutiny for
decades, his position fails to account for the majority of students whose dreams
do not pan out quite as planned. Tebow is a statistical oddity as one of the 2% of
college athletes who go on to play for a professional league183 and the first
sophomore in NCAA history to become a Heisman winner.184 Given his
extraordinary talents and likelihood of earning a draft spot in the NFL, it makes
sense that Tebow maintained the conviction to focus on high-level athletic
performance in exchange for other aspects of the college experience during his
undergraduate years. However, the “dream” is not what it seems for many college
athletes, especially those who are not standout talents viewed as eligible for a
professional league or those who compete in a non-revenue-generating sport that
may not even offer professional opportunities.
One example of an athlete whose experiences demonstrate the perils of
amateurism is Stephanie Campbell, a Villanova University graduate who played
women’s field hockey throughout all four of her undergraduate years and even
served as team captain.185 Upon graduating high school and accepting a $19,000
athletic scholarship, Stephanie genuinely believed she was headed toward her
dream.186 Almost immediately, however, she realized her experience would be
nothing of the sort—balancing academics and athletics would be impossible given
her rigorous practice schedule and staying on the team would require sacrificing

180. See, e.g., Katherine Kargl, Note, Is Amateurism Really Necessary or Is It an Illusion Supporting the
NCAA’s Anticompetitive Behaviors?: The Need for Preserving Amateurism in College Athletics, 2017 U. ILL.
L. REV. 379, 410 (2017).
181. See Kelly, supra note 126.
182. Id.
183. NCAA Recruiting Facts, supra note 168.
184. Tim Tebow, HEISMAN TROPHY, https://www.heisman.com/heisman-winners/tim-tebow/
[https://perma.cc/LP4C-YFHE].
185. Bill Pennington, It’s Not an Adventure, It’s a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/sports/12lifestyles.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLH-B872].
186. Id.
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any semblance of a personal life.187 In spite of feeling completely overwhelmed
and unmotivated, Stephanie’s parents made clear that staying on scholarship
needed to be her first priority, and that she needed to start viewing her athletic
commitments as a job because no other institution would provide comparable
financial support.188 Unfortunately, this type of experience reflects the norm, not
the exception, in college athletics.189 Many athletes from Division I universities
report upholding their commitment to participate in college athletics solely for
the benefit of receiving their scholarship money each semester,190 which
completely undermines the presumption on which the NCAA’s amateurism
theory depends—that college athletes play for the love of the game and not for
compensation.191
Opponents may argue that permitting student-athletes to earn compensation
for use of NIL will only perpetuate the issue by incentivizing athletes to pursue
collegiate opportunities solely for the sake of making money from sports-related
endorsements.192 However, anecdotal data from college athletes suggests financial
hardships and a general lack of resources for non-revenue sports—which in turn
impart a fundraising responsibility on student-athletes to secure necessities like
sweatpants or batting gloves—impose a great deal of stress on student-athletes that
is not alleviated by receipt of a partial scholarship and may even contribute to
their loss of love for the sport.193 Perhaps if student-athletes were empowered to
remedy those monetary burdens through endorsement opportunities, fewer
stressors would impede their enjoyment of athletics. Moreover, student-athletes
would be highly motivated to improve their skills and share that expertise with
aspiring college athletes, if unrestrained from capitalizing on their ability to
instruct others.
The notion that self-interest will breed a more motivated generation of college
athletes may be off-putting, but it simply encompasses the “deeply American
concept” of engaging in hard work in order to earn something valuable, which
proponents for amateurism cannot deny underlies the collegiate system and
American society more broadly.194 Thus, while the principle of amateurism is
honorable in some respects due its encouragement of love for the sport, deference
to the tradition is neither owed in a legal sense, nor does it fairly accommodate
the hardships associated with modern collegiate athletics.
2. Practical Concerns Associated with Athletes’ NIL Rights
On its face, a policy granting student-athletes the right to monetize their NILs
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See Tristan Griffin, Payment of College Student-Athletes at Center of Legal Battles, 75 TEX. BAR
J. 850, 852 (2012).
192. See, e.g., Ben Sutton, A Case for Amateurism in College Sports, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 21, 2014),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/04/21/Opinion/Ben-Sutton.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6RNE-P3PZ].
193. Pennington, supra note 185.
194. See Sutton, supra note 192.
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appears to constitute a moral victory in terms of shifting wealth and power away
from the NCAA and into the hands of the student-athletes themselves.195
However, critics suggest that in shrouding new student-athlete compensation
policies in principled language, state legislators including Nancy Skinner of the
California Senate—who spearheaded the passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act—have
completely overlooked certain practical considerations that will make such
policies logistically unworkable, irrespective of noble intent.196 Criticisms of the
Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny are generally concerned with preventing the
exploitation of high school student-athletes,197 correcting misconceptions about
the financial state of the NCAA and college athletics programs more generally,198
and drawing attention to the potential for broad-based NIL legislation to facilitate
corruption in college sports.199 While each of these issues poses a logistical hurdle,
they are not so problematic as to render student-athlete compensation for use of
NIL an unworkable task. Rather, these issues only underscore the need for a
solution at the federal level in the form of comprehensive legislation that accounts
for these practical challenges.
a. Potential Exploitation of High School Athletes and Overall Impact on
Recruiting
The passage of the Fair Pay to Play Act was immediately met with pushback
from those advocating on behalf of high school athletes, who argue the California
statute and its progeny will devastate the college recruiting process. For instance,
the National Federation of State High School Associations—the high school
equivalent of the NCAA—published an article in November 2019 that criticizes
the inaugural statute’s provisions and its potential impact on the recruiting
process at the lower education level.200 While the Fair Pay to Play Act does not
extend NIL rights to high school student-athletes,201 it is possible that companies
seeking high-profile athletes for future endorsement deals will succumb to
competition and begin recruiting endorsers prematurely, potentially before they
even reach high school.202 Specifically, companies may pursue athletes either by
directly reaching out to students and their families, or “through the wide variety
of ‘handlers’ who for decades have created havoc in the sports world by often
acting in their own self-interest as opposed to the best interests of young student195. See Kristi Dosh, Is the Fair Pay to Play Act More Moral Victory than Jackpot for Student Athletes?,
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2019/10/03/is-thefair-pay-to-play-act-more-moral-victory-than-jackpot-for-student-athletes/#111a41f57a57
[https://perma.cc/DM7K-2CQ8].
196. See, e.g., Mark Zeigler, Fair Pay for College Athletes? Be Careful What You Wish for, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB.
(Sept.
30,
2019,
5:54
PM),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/aztecs/story/2019-09-30/fair-pay-to-play-californiancaa-gavin-newsom-name-image-likeness-college-sports-student-athletes
[https://perma.cc/W75RKYDX].
197. Green, supra note 155.
198. Zeigler, supra note 196.
199. See id.
200. Green, supra note 155.
201. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(g) (West 2019).
202. Green, supra note 155.
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athletes.”203 Even with the barrier of high school athletic directors and coaches
who will presumably act in student-athletes’ best interests, critics are anxious that
protecting young athletes from exploitation will be made difficult or impossible
once companies view athletes as marketing tools with monetary value.204
b. Misconceptions About the Financial Position of the NCAA and College
Athletics Departments
Some critics oppose the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny on grounds that
perceptions about the financial position of the NCAA and college athletics
programs more broadly are misinformed, and that state legislators lack the
necessary expertise to reform the sports industry in an economically feasible
manner.205 For instance, while the general public assumes university athletics
programs are “rolling in the dough,” the NCAA reports that only twenty-four
athletic departments in the country turned a profit in 2015, and that “the median
loss among 129 schools in the Football Bowl Subdivision—the sport’s highest
college level with the highest revenue streams—was $18 million” that year.206
Given these statistics, some are concerned that athletic departments will suffer
further financial distress once brands realize they can pay individual athletes
directly, and at a lower cost, as opposed to negotiating with university athletic
programs for the participation of entire sports teams in marketing campaigns.207
The fact that supporters of the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny have placed
emphasis on remedying a system that unfairly restrains the rights of studentathletes as individuals208 without fully contemplating the potential economic
implications for third-parties suggests that more attention should be paid to the
financial logistics of NIL rights prior to the implementation of new policies.
c. Risks Inherent in Opening Pandora’s Box
In addition to the practical challenges associated with transforming the college
sports industry through legislation, the notion that a law permitting studentathletes to benefit from use of their NIL will open “Pandora’s Box” is a genuine
concern shared by many.209 Larry Scott, the commissioner of the PAC-12
Conference, expressed this sentiment in an interview, arguing the Fair Pay to Play
Act would “effectively create a free-for-all in which large payments to a relative
handful of star athletes from boosters and others could be thinly disguised as
payment for the use of their name, image and likeness.”210 Essentially, critics fear
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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Id.
Zeigler, supra note 196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Joan Niesen, What College Football Coaches Are Saying About the Fair Pay to Play Act,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/coaches-fair-payplay-act [https://perma.cc/K8ZE-872G]; Matthew Bain, How Athlete Endorsements Will Change College
Sports Recruiting Forever: ‘It Opens Pandora’s Box’, USA TODAY (Oct. 10, 2019, 2:40 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2019/10/09/college-recruiting-faces-seismicchange-if-ncaa-allows-endorsements/3908164002/ [https://perma.cc/U4MS-3JPW].
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the Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny will make it impossible to restrict wealthy
alumni from paying student-athletes directly because such transfers will be
deemed legal so long as some service or commodity, such as an autographed jersey,
is exchanged under the guise of an “endorsement.”211 While the aforementioned
practical oversights represent legitimate concerns, they may be effectively solved
by the implementation of a comprehensive federal law addressing such issues.
VI. THE SOLUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL LAW
PERMITTING STUDENT-ATHLETES TO EARN COMPENSATION FOR
USE OF THEIR NILS
Considering the social and economic advantages to be gained from legislation
authorizing student-athlete compensation for NIL, the implementation of a
federal law represents the most efficient and equitable method for establishing a
more evenhanded dynamic between college athletes and the all-powerful NCAA,
as envisioned by California legislators in passing the Fair Pay to Play Act. While
critics eagerly point to several practical considerations state legislators have
overlooked thus far,212 their concerns—which are admittedly valid—could be
wholly alleviated by a comprehensive federal law. In fact, several members of
Congress have already introduced bills addressing NIL rights in collegiate sports.
Representative Mark Walker led the way by proposing a bill in March 2019 that
would alter the tax code so as to “force the NCAA to allow players to make money
from endorsements or risk losing their nonprofit tax exemptions.”213 While this
effort contributed to the pressure mounting against the NCAA’s amateurism
policy in 2019, the NCAA’s recent declaration that it will give student-athletes a
right to earn compensation from endorsements on some level suggests Walker’s
proposal may be redundant to the extent it merely establishes the same right.
Building on the momentum from Walker’s bill, several congressmen
introduced more thorough proposals in 2020 meant to expand protections for
college athletes beyond merely establishing NIL rights, though some afford undue
deference to the NCAA. For instance, Representative Anthony Gonzalez—a
former Ohio State University football star—introduced the Gonzalez-Cleaver bill
in September 2020 together with Representative Emmanuel Cleaver.214 While the
proposal would allow student-athletes to earn compensation through
endorsements, it also “satisfies several NCAA requests” such as preempting state
NIL laws and prohibiting athletes from working with companies associated with
18, 2019), https://www.sportspromedia.com/analysis/ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-act-california-collegesports-larry-scott-newsom [https://perma.cc/85YS-GF5J].
211. Green, supra note 155.
212. See Zeigler, supra note 196.
213. Dan Murphy, Congressman to Propose Federal Legislation for Paying College Athletes, ESPN (Oct.
3, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27751454/congressmanpropose-federal-legislation-paying-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/N7FV-M9RZ]; see H.R. 1804,
116th Cong. (2019).
214. Ross Dellenger, Bipartisan Name, Image, Likeness Bill Focused on Endorsements Introduced to
Congress, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/09/24/nameimage-likeness-bill-congress-endorsements [https://perma.cc/5KYJ-HBSH]; see H.R. 8382, 116th
Cong. (2020).
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drugs, alcohol, gambling, or adult entertainment.215 Senator Marco Rubio’s bill
likewise preempts state NIL laws and also blatantly panders to the NCAA by
exempting the organization from antitrust scrutiny.216 At the other end of the
spectrum, however, more player-friendly proposals may struggle to garner
bipartisan support because of their broad scope. For instance, Senator Cory
Booker introduced the “College Athletes Bill of Rights” in December 2020, which
would guarantee NCAA athletes “monetary compensation, long-term health care,
lifetime educational scholarships and even revenue sharing.”217
While the above proposals expired at the end of the 2019–2020 congressional
session, they laid the foundation for key legislative debates and may be
reintroduced in 2021. Yet, each fails to adequately balance the rights of studentathletes against the business interests of the NCAA in a manner that would not
only pass bipartisan scrutiny, but also be workable in a practical sense. Thus, the
remainder of this Comment outlines a framework for a comprehensive federal
law authorizing student-athletes to earn compensation for use of their NILs, with
a focus on protecting athletes’ rights from being compromised by the NCAA while
providing innovative solutions to the practical concerns identified in the previous
section.
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ENFORCEMENT BODY TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION
AND RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER STUDENT-ATHLETES’ NIL RIGHTS
The establishment of an enforcement body to monitor compliance with a new
federal law will be essential to effective implementation and continued oversight
of rules governing student-athlete compensation. The Fair Pay to Play Act
noticeably lacks any type of enforcement mechanism, leaving universities and
athletes in the dark as to how potential violations will be reported and resolved.218
On the same token, the Act fails to provide any information about the
consequences of a violation, in terms of whether civil or criminal liability will
attach and who is subject to liability in the first place.219 In crafting a new federal
law, Congress should preempt litigation on the subject of how to adjudicate
disputes in this area by identifying the appropriate enforcement agents.
Currently, the NCAA’s own legislative bodies oversee and manage all topics
“affecting sports rules, championships, health and safety, matters impacting
women in athletics and opportunities for minorities.”220 Considering the NCAA
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Cong. (2020).
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SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/17/athlete-bill-ofrights-congress-ncaa-football [https://perma.cc/VU32-GPNT]; see S. 5062, 116th Cong. (2020).
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is currently developing policies on compensation for student-athlete endorsement
opportunities, the organization would presumably assert jurisdiction over such
policies as falling within the definition of “sports rules.” However, the NCAA’s
governance structure consists of volunteers from member schools for each of the
three NCAA divisions, plus a Board of Governors which consists of presidents
and chancellors from all divisions.221 In light of the extremely negative initial
reaction by NCAA leaders regarding state legislation permitting paid studentathlete endorsements,222 it seems unlikely the organization would be inclined to
regulate compensation-related issues evenhandedly, without attempting to slowly
undermine the impact of NIL rights. Moreover, the fact that a majority of
individuals involved in NCAA governance work for universities suggests the
financial interests of the enforcement body would be unlikely to align with those
of student-athletes if the organization were authorized to enforce NIL rules.223
Thus, Congress should consider granting authority to an independent regulatory
body as it crafts a new federal law, to minimize the possibility that conflicts of
interest will interfere with just enforcement.
The notion that an independent enforcement body should be implemented is
not entirely novel, considering a failed bill in Florida sought to establish a
government-run task force to oversee student-athletes’ NIL rights in the state.224
Still, a creative solution is necessary to facilitate enforcement at the federal level.
State-by-state enforcement would be ineffective in the sense that each state’s “task
force” would be incentivized to design an enforcement scheme that favors its own
athletes if comprised of university-affiliated officials, and different states might
interpret uniform standards inconsistently. In addition, attempting to enforce
policies and adjudicate violations involving multiple schools in different states
could create confusion over jurisdiction and yield varying outcomes. Thus, a more
sensible solution would involve delegating enforcement power to a task force
within the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as proposed by the Gonzalez-Cleaver
bill,225 which could appropriately promulgate endorsement policies, adjudicate
unfair competition disputes, and work in connection with law enforcement
agencies to promote fair competition and the protection of consumers.226
The FTC’s goals already directly parallel those underlying the movement to
grant NIL rights to student-athletes,227 and its clear-cut adjudicatory proceedings
[https://perma.cc/QV4P-UY6G].
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would serve as the ideal mechanism for resolving endorsement-related disputes
without unnecessarily involving courts in matters that likely do not warrant the
imposition of civil or criminal liability. Additionally, granting the FTC—a wellestablished entity that has famously cracked down on unfair methods of
competition since 1915228—the responsibility to oversee new student-athlete
compensation regulations will provide a sense of stability and predictability in a
rapidly changing industry, whereas the uncertainties associated with introducing
a new enforcement mechanism would only put Fair Pay legislation on even
shakier grounds.
Moreover, empowering the FTC to investigate corruption in this realm would
effectively address concerns about the opening of “Pandora’s Box,” considering
alumni and boosters may in fact be tempted to camouflage direct payments as
endorsement opportunities.229 Perhaps an FTC task force could promulgate
standardized valuations for various endorsement opportunities based on the
market value of such endorsements at the professional level, adjusting for college
athletes’ geographic location and skill level. Then, when an individual or
commercial entity pays an athlete directly in exchange for their endorsement, the
federal task force will be responsible for investigating such payments to the extent
they unreasonably exceed the standardized valuation.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF WORKABLE AND FAIR RECRUITING REGULATIONS
Effectively implementing federal legislation that authorizes student-athlete
compensation also depends on the law’s inclusion of workable high school
recruitment guidelines. The risk that colleges will be capable of poaching alreadyyoung athletes earlier and earlier in their sports careers by luring them in with the
promise of lucrative endorsements is viewed as threatening the integrity of
athletics altogether.230 The task of drafting guidelines for high school recruitment
is complicated by the variable timing of athletes’ decisions to commit to college
sports teams. In general, NCAA regulations currently restrict colleges from
contacting athletes about collegiate opportunities until June fifteenth following a
high school student’s sophomore year, or September first of the student’s junior
year, depending on the sport, division level, and type of communication.231
Codifying the NCAA’s rules regarding initial outreach would actually be an
effective solution to concerns regarding extremely young athletes being subjected
to recruitment efforts, as the law would require colleges to hold off on contacting
athletes until the summer before their junior year at the earliest.232 Under the
current NCAA framework, many athletes commit to colleges as early as eighth
grade through informal “verbal commitments” because the NCAA turns a blind
228. Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history
[https://perma.cc/X658-RFFW].
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eye to violations of its self-imposed deadlines.233 In elevating the NCAA’s
restrictions on timing to the status of federal law and tasking an enforcement body
to investigate and punish violations of such restrictions, colleges would be forced
to comply with a system that more fairly allocates opportunity for schools by
ensuring all are prohibited from gaining a “leg up” in recruiting. At the same time,
athletes would be encouraged to spend more time exploring their options instead
of committing prematurely.
In addition to guidelines surrounding the timing of initial outreach by
collegiate recruiters, provisions governing the ability of colleges to offer
endorsement opportunities as a recruiting tool are necessary to preserve fair
competition among schools. Proposing endorsement opportunities during
recruiting would not only give certain colleges an unfair advantage but also put
undue pressure on high school student-athletes to sacrifice college experiences
that may best suit them in order to pursue promises of monetary gain. While those
potential consequences are undoubtedly problematic, one solution could involve
a statutory provision imposing exorbitant fines—and even personal liability—
against collegiate representatives who broach the subject of endorsement
opportunities with high school athletes not officially committed to the college’s
athletic program. Colleges should be given discretion to inform their studentathletes about endorsement opportunities only after athletes have officially ended
their recruitment by signing a legally binding National Letter of Intent (NLI)
committing to a school during their senior year of high school.234
As for when athletes become eligible to receive compensation for participating
in endorsement opportunities, the NLI provisions suggest restricting athletes from
receiving payments until at least the first day of college classes in the fall would be
prudent.235 For instance, a student-athlete’s NLI, though legally binding, becomes
null and void if it turns out he or she is denied admission to the college, fails to
meet NCAA eligibility requirements, fails to graduate from their two-year college
if transferring, or violates recruiting rules before opening day in the fall.236 Based
on the number of contingencies that may dissolve the relationship between a
student-athlete and the college they have made an official commitment to,
restricting compensation until the first day of school protects both parties to the
NLI by ensuring student-athletes are actually eligible to compete during the year.
Some may argue that certain collegiate sports, including football, would be
disadvantaged by such a policy given that their seasons begin in the summer and,
therefore, depend on marketing strategies rolled out in the spring. One workable
solution would be to allow high school athletes to participate in endorsements
any time after they sign an NLI, yet remain ineligible to receive compensation for
such work until opening day, in the form of a deferred payment.
233. See Joe Leccesi, Five Most Common Questions About Verbal Commitments, USA TODAY (Apr.
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C. MANDATING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG STUDENT-ATHLETES
In addition to protecting high school athletes by imposing stringent regulations
on the recruiting front, federal legislators should consider mandating some form
of educational program aimed at supporting collegiate student-athletes as they
attempt to manage finances related to compensation for the use of NIL rights.
Student-athletes should be allowed to embrace their full monetization potential
by contracting with licensed sports agents as permitted under the Fair Pay to Play
Act,237 considering professional agents are best-equipped to negotiate on behalf of
athletes and to ensure marketing deals involve reputable brands that will benefit
their clients.238 While the opportunity to seek out endorsements through an agent
will increase the likelihood of student-athletes profiting from use of their NILs,
athletes as young as seventeen or eighteen years likely have minimal to no
experience managing finances or properly filing taxes.239 Yet, the tax code requires
individuals receiving compensation for use of NIL to report such income on their
federal tax returns.240 Further, the majority of states impose a state income tax,
which incites confusion for athletes whose residency and in-state activities vary
depending on where opportunities arise.241 Because student-athletes may be illequipped to realize the financial responsibilities associated with collecting NIL
payments, Congress should strongly consider implementing a provision that
mandates colleges and universities to provide financial literacy courses to their
athletes. Perhaps federal funding could even be directed toward assigning CPAs
and attorneys specializing in tax issues to guide college athletes through the filing
process.
D. IMPOSITION OF LIMITS ON STUDENT-ATHLETE COMPENSATION FOR THE
BENEFIT OF COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS
Lastly, as a practical matter, successfully implementing a federal student-athlete
compensation law requires understanding the financial state of college athletics
programs overall and designing systems that are economically feasible for colleges.
As discussed, while men’s football and basketball programs within a specific
subset of elite athletic departments do generate considerable revenue, the majority
of athletic programs in the United States, and dozens of teams even at top-earning
schools, lose millions of dollars every year.242 Thus, while a bill like New York’s,
which proposes dividing 15% of revenue generated from athletic ticket sales to be
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shared among student-athletes,243 may be feasible for a few schools, the reality is
that most college athletics programs are already struggling to stay afloat as the
industry becomes increasingly commercialized.244 The COVID-19 pandemic has
only made matters worse, as the effective cancellation of sporting events for the
larger part of 2020 caused severe losses in ticket sales and other revenue streams
for university sports.245 For example, the University of Michigan lost almost half
of its $200 million athletic budget due to COVID-19.246 Several colleges were
forced to eradicate sports teams altogether during 2020 if they did not generate
sufficient revenue.247 Given that ticket sales are a vital source of income for
athletic departments in combination with alumni donations and TV rights,248
requiring schools to redirect that portion of their revenue to student-athletes
would only worsen the economic state of collegiate athletics overall.
In order to protect athletic programs from descending further into debt,
Congress should consider alternative provisions that aim to compensate schools
in the event sponsors begin focusing their monetary contributions on individual
athletes instead of contributing to athletic programs as a whole. Perhaps, Congress
could impose an additional tax on businesses that hire student-athletes for
product endorsements, then use the revenue to establish a federal program aimed
at supporting collegiate athletic teams. In this way, student-athletes could still
retain their full NIL compensations and schools would ultimately benefit from
allowing their student-athletes to engage with paid opportunities. Overall, while
it is true certain practical considerations were overlooked in the drafting of the
Fair Pay to Play Act and its progeny, a federal law represents the best avenue
through which to resolve complex legal and financial issues through creative
solutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
No longer does amateurism suffice to justify the NCAA’s immunity from
scrutiny in society at large or within the court system. No longer should studentathletes be forced to sacrifice their bodies, academic potential, and futures for the
sake of generating revenue for a corporation that brings in $1 billion a year, which
it is too greedy to share. While these principles are agreeable in theory, the
difficulty and complexity of constructing a workable legislative solution on a stateby-state basis threatens to undermine efforts to grant athletes NIL rights. Thus, in
order to constrain the NCAA’s dominance in the face of practical challenges
associated with an entirely new athlete compensation system, Congress should
take preemptive action to ensure the NIL rights of college athletes are respected.
Thankfully, members of Congress on both sides of the aisle are demonstrating
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support for a federal solution resembling the Fair Pay to Play Act, suggesting that
the rights of student-athletes are being taken seriously. As of April 2021, at least
seven congressional bills addressing collegiate NIL compensation have been
introduced and two are currently under consideration. The “College Athlete
Economic Freedom Act,” proposed by Senator Chris Murphy and Representative
Lori Trahan, would secure athletes a virtually unrestrained right to earn NIL
income and even to organize trade unions.249 Perhaps more likely to garner
bipartisan support, Senator Jerry Moran’s “Amateur Athletes Protection and
Compensation Act of 2021” takes a middle ground approach—more in alignment
with the framework this Comment recommends—by placing reasonable
limitations on endorsement opportunities without pandering to the NCAA
through safe harbor provisions as in Senator Rubio’s bill. 250 In any event,
immediate congressional action is necessary to preclude the NCAA from raising
practical objections to the several state laws going into effect this year. Thus,
instead of continuing to introduce multiple variations on the same right through
numerous legislative proposals, Congress should focus on joining forces to finally
overthrow the NCAA’s archaic and injurious regime as soon as possible.

249. See S. 238, 117th Cong. (2021).
250. See S. 414, 117th Cong. (2021).

